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This paper will examine the transformation dynamics of social change in 
Kurdish Alevi communities, while mostly focusing on the increasing socio- 
political and religious role of talips. Until the end of the 20th century, the 
socio-religious structure of Kurdish Alevis was dominated by two hereditary 
social positions, much like a caste system: on the one hand, the members 
of the sacred lineages (ocaks), who embody the religious authority, and on 
the other hand, the talips who are subordinated to the sacred lineages. This 
socio-religious structure provided a framework for Kurdish Alevi socio- 
religious organisations.
Large-scale destruction in the course of the 20th century greatly affected 
Kurdish Alevi tribal communities, destroying their cultural institutions, and 
tearing apart religious relationships between sacred lineages and their fol-
lowers. Over time, talips were able to take the initiative with regard to the 
organisation of the religion and identity politics. This paper will analyse 
the reformation of religious practices from the theoretical perspective of 
religion-making.1 For around two decades, talips have been instrumentalis-
ing sacred places – a core component of Kurdish Alevi belief – in a way that 
reproduces Dersim cultural identity. This has led to an intriguing example of 
a religion-making process, in which some Western notions of both religion 
and politics have taken hold. While struggling against the Turkish state for 
official recognition of their religious and national identity, Kurdish Alevis 
began to form new religio-political institutions, theological discourses and 
even rituals that included some modern notions and ideas. For example, they 
claimed gender equality, social harmony, environmentalism, modernism (in 
the sense of living a Western lifestyle) and secularism (in the sense of being 
politically opposed to Islam, which the AKP regime in Turkey represents) as 
core discourses and distinguishing features of the religion.
1 Markus Dreßler, “Modes of Religionization: A Constructivist Approach to Secularity,” 
Working Paper Series of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Mo-
dernities” 7 (Leipzig: 2019): 3–16.
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While the transformation and re-making of Alevi religious identi-
ty has been a popular topic in international academia since the religious 
revival of Alevism began in the 1990s, the case of the Kurdish Alevis still 
requires further attention. The cultural transformation dynamics of con-
temporary Kurdish Alevism reveal unique sociological examples in terms 
of religion-making processes. Kurdish Alevis have experienced large-scale 
socio-cultural changes in recent decades. They have spread around the 
world, with many moving to Western Europe. Their lifestyles have changed 
dramatically; they have faced forced evacuations because of the war be-
tween armed guerrilla groups and the Turkish state. With their geographic 
area mostly destroyed, they have had to leave behind rural lifestyles. This, 
in turn, resulted in the disintegration of Kurdish Alevis’ socio-religious 
organisations and practices. Nevertheless, Kurdish Alevis still maintain 
close contact with their sacred and beloved land, Dersim. While the socio- 
religious obligatory relations between sacred lineages and their followers 
(talips) have almost vanished, sacred place beliefs have become increasingly 
important in maintaining the ability to practise the religion and are repre-
sentative of the cultural identity. More importantly, in my view, while sacred 
places have always been seen as a practical way of practising the religion, 
talips have taken the initiative with regard to re-producing2 the religion.
Tunceli, a small, Kurdish-Alevi-dominated province in Eastern Turkey, 
has played an important role in the revival of Kurdish Alevism. The province 
can be regarded as a socio-cultural centre, whose significance is acknowl-
edged far beyond the region’s borders. The historical name for the region was 
Dersim, a name that has been pushed to the fore with the revival of Kurdish 
Alevism. Although Tunceli and Dersim are used synonymously, I use Dersim 
to refer to the cultural geographic area, that is, the area that Kurdish Alevis 
associate with their re-invented ethno-religious identity. Nowadays, Dersim is 
not only a powerful symbol, but also serves as a reflection of transnational 
Kurdish Alevi communities. Today’s Tunceli province should be regarded 
as a religious/sacred centre of the community. Kurmanci- and Kırmancki- 
speaking Kurdish Alevis, who can be considered sub-communities of the 
largest religious minority in Turkey (the Alevis), constitute the majority of 
the population of Tunceli.
2 I understand ‘re-producing religion’ to be part of ‘re-producing culture’, that is, the idea 
that social relations and structures are continuously renewed. 
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Despite Alevism and Kurdishness being popular topics in international 
academic circles since the 1990s,3 Kurdish Alevism remained less known 
until the turn of the century. Kurdish Alevi identity involves intersected 
cultural boundaries between Alevism and Kurdishness. Its cultural sphere 
creates a unique cultural identity, in that both identities gain new socio- 
political and ethno-religious aspects. Kurdish Alevis share many similar-
ities with other Alevi communities. However, they have their own socio- 
religious organisations, sacred place practices, mythological discourses 
and rituals. Although Kurdish Alevis now tend to define themselves as 
Kurds, their cultural heritage gives rise to many differences compared with 
other Kurdish communities and Kurdish nationalist politics. 
During the early republic, some state-related amateur researchers de-
scribed Kurdish Alevis as the assimilated descendants of pre-Islamic Turks.4 
This interpretation focuses on religious identity to define the particularity of 
Kurdish Alevis. Others, who claim that Kurdish Alevis have entirely different 
ethnic origins and a unique cultural origin that is referred to as Zaza, prefer 
to focus on the language (Kırmancki) as a defining feature of their socio-
logical particularity. These differing definitions reflect the fact that Kurdish 
Alevism involves two sometimes conflicting cultural formations, namely 
3 For the first detailed edited volume about Kurdish Alevis (for English readers), see: Erdal 
Gezik and Ahmet Kerim Gültekin, Kurdish Alevis and the Case of Dersim: Historical and 
Contemporary Insights (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2019). There are also some academic 
works (for English readers) that deal with religious, political, and historical aspects of 
Kurdish Alevis’ cultural identity. See: Besim Can Zırh, “Kırmančiya Belekê: Understan-
ding Alevi Geography in Between Spaces of Longing and Belonging,” in Alevis in Europe: 
Voices of Migration, Culture and Identity, ed. Tözün Issa (London, New York: Routledge, 
2017); Martin van Bruinessen, “Between Dersim and Dâlahû: Reflections on Kurdish 
Alevism and the Ahl-i Haqq Religion,” in Islamic Alternatives: Non-Mainstream Religi-
on in Persianate Societies, ed. Shahrokh Raei (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2017); Lokman 
Turgut, “An Inside View of the Kurdish Alevis: Diwana Heq of Pir Ali Bali,” in Religi-
ous Minorities in Kurdistan: Beyond Mainstream, ed. Khanna Omarkhali (Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz, 2014); Janroj Keles, “The Politics of Religious and Ethnic Identity among 
Kurdish Alevis in the Homeland and Diaspora,” in Religious Minorities in Kurdistan: Be-
yond Mainstream, ed. Khanna Omarkhali (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2014); Martin van 
Bruinessen, “ ‘Aslını inkar eden haramzadedir!’: The debate on the ethnic identity of the 
Kurdish Alevis,” in Syncretistic Religious Communities in the Near East, ed. Krisztina Ke-
hl-Bodrogi, Barbara Kellner-Heinkele, and Anke Otter-Beaujean (Leiden: Brill, 1997); 
Paul J. White and Joost Jongerden, Turkey’s Alevi Enigma (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2003); 
Peter J. Bumke, “Kızılbaş-Kurden in Dersim (Tunceli, Türkei): Marginalität und Häresie,” 
Anthropos, no. 74 (1979).
4 Sabır Güler, Ötekinin Ötekisi – Etno-Dinsel Bir kimlik Olarak Alevi Kürtlüğün İnşası 
(İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2019), 125.
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Kurdishness and Alevism. Given that Alevism and Kurdishness are not of-
ficially recognised religious or ethnic identities in the Republic of Turkey, 
Kurdish Alevis have faced discrimination, oppression, alienation and forced 
assimilation for centuries. Thus, both Alevi and Kurdish politicisation pro-
cesses, which began in the early 1990s, have had significant multi-faceted 
impacts on the re-producing of a Kurdish Alevi cultural identity.
The data analysed in this paper is drawn from long-term ethnographical 
fieldwork conducted in Dersim in 2015 and 2016.5
A Brief Socio-Historical Framework for Several Identity-Driven  
Notions: Kurdishness, Alevism, Kurdish Alevism and Dersim
Alevism is a highly controversial religious belief. Most scholars agree that 
it can be defined as a unique religious system or a form of Islamic hetero-
doxy in Turkey. Debate surrounding Alevism seems to focus on the five 
pillars of Islam6, especially when it comes to defining who a Muslim is. 
Alevis do not follow the five pillars, although they have maintained certain 
discourses and practices associated with the household of the prophet of 
Islam for centuries particularly Ali (the prophet’s paternal cousin) and his 
descendants – to define their religious identity. Kurdish Alevis emphasise 
semi-deific characteristics of their hereditary sacred lineages rather than 
Islamic historical figures in order to define the uniqueness of their religion.
Alevi communities mainly live in a wide geographical area that reaches 
from the Balkans to the Middle East. Additionally, a sizeable number have 
been living in Western Europe for over half a century. They speak different 
languages, have diverse historical backgrounds, belong to various ethnic 
5 This paper provides an abbreviated framework of some arguments from the larger project 
report which will be published in Turkish. Ahmet Kerim Gültekin, Kemeré Duzgı’dan Düzgün 
Baba’ya Dersim Aleviliğinde (Raa Haqi İnancında) Kutsal Mekânın Toplumsal Yeniden Üretimi 
– Kültürel Süreçlerde Süreklilik Halleri (İstanbul: Bilim ve Gelecek Yayınları, forthcoming). I 
would like to thank Markus Dressler for his constructive feedback on this paper.
6 The five pillars of Islam refer to the five rules that are accepted as mandatory. These are 
shahadah, to accept Muhammed as a prophet of one, true God; salat, to pray five times 
a day; zekat, to donate 2.5% of one’s income to the poor; sawm, to fast during Ramadan 
(the month of fasting) and hajj, to go to Mecca on pilgrimage. While there are differences 
between how the main sects of Islam practise the five pillars, it is agreed that these acts 
define what a Muslim is. Alevi communities also have different ways of understanding 
and practising these pillars. However, the majority, and particularly Kurdish Alevis, do 
not follow them. 
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identities and have different citizenships. They also have diverse religious 
customs. Today, most Alevis live in Turkey. They are the main socio- 
religious and political actors of today’s multiple Alevisms7. Alevis in Turkey 
are still struggling to gain official recognition from the Republic of Turkey, 
despite being granted formal status as an Islamic sect or an independent reli-
gion by some European countries. Due to this contradictory position, they 
have become a much-discussed topic between Brussels (EU) and Ankara 
(Turkey), especially given that Turkey is pursuing EU membership. Once 
defining Alevism became a matter of international politics and a legal cri-
terion for earning constitutional rights, academic work relating to Alevism 
started to gain importance. 
Alevism, as a defining term, covers heterogeneous ethno-religious 
communities throughout a vast geographic area and the term refers to var-
ious social, political, historical and religious contexts.8 Dressler establishes 
four primary historical meanings of the term Alevi.9 First, Alevi is used to 
7 I use this term to include political and religious differences among Alevi communities. For 
a brief understanding of various political orientations among Alevi associations, see: Tahire 
Erman and Emrah Göker, “Alevi Politics in Contemporary Turkey,” Middle Eastern Studies 36, 
no. 4 (2000). 
8 For a comprehensive understanding of Alevism, see: Markus Dressler, “Alevīs,” in Ency-
clopaedia of Islam, vol. 3, ed. Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, 
and Everett Rowson (Leiden: Brill, 2008); Celia Jenkins, Suavi Aydın, and Umit Cetin, 
Alevism as an Ethno-Religious Identity: Contested Boundaries (London: Routledge, 2018); 
Benjamin Weineck and Johannes Zimmermann, Alevism Between Standardisation and 
Plurality: Negotiating Texts, Sources and Cultural Heritage (Frankfurt a. M.: PL Publish-
ers, 2018); Suavi Aydın, “The Emergence of Alevism as an Ethno-Religious Identity,” 
National Identities 20, no.1 (2018); Issa Tözün, Alevis in Europe: Voices of Migration, Cul-
ture and Identity (London, New York: Routledge, 2017); Çakır Ceyhan Suvari and Elif 
Kanca, “The Alevi Discourse in Turkey,” in Studies on Iran and The Caucasus, ed. Uwe 
Bläsing, Victoria Arakelova, and Matthias Weinreich (Leiden: Brill, 2015); Talha Köse, 
“Ideological or Religious? Contending Visions on the Future of Alevi Identity,” Identi-
ties: Global Studies in Culture and Power 19, no. 5 (2012); Markus Dressler, Writing Reli-
gion: The Making of Turkish Alevi Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Elise 
Massicard, The Alevis in Turkey and Europe: Identity and Managing Territorial Diversity 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); Ali Yaman and Aykan Erdemir, Alevism – Bektashism: A 
Brief Introduction (Istanbul: Barış Matbaacılık, 2006); Tord Olsson, Elisabeth Özdalga, 
and Catharina Raudvere, Alevi Identity – Cultural, Religious, Social Perspectives (Istan-
bul: Swedish Research Institute, 2005); Özlem Göner, “The Transformation of the Alevi 
Collective Identity,” Cultural Dynamics 17, no. 2 (2005); David Shankland, The Alevis in 
Turkey: The Emergence of a Secular Islamic Tradition (London: Routledge, 2003); White 
and Jongerden, Turkey’s Alevi Enigma.
9 Dressler, “Alevīs.”
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refer to a member of the sacred lineage10 of Ali, who is a paternal cousin 
(and also son-in-law) of the prophet of Islam. Second, it defines a political 
position for individuals who support Ali and the struggle that occurred 
immediately following the prophet’s death. Third, as a result of this po-
litical aspect, the term refers to religious heresy. State-associated Islamic 
authorities have described Alevism as heretical for centuries. Needless to 
say, Islamic authorities represent Sunni domination (orthodoxy).11 Fourth, 
Alevi is a product of Turkish modernism. This final understanding provides 
the contemporary socio-political and religious framework for state-related 
intellectual debates on Alevi communities in Turkey. 
The term Alevism should be considered here as a result of the specific 
modernisation processes Turkey underwent during the 20th century.12 After 
the Republic of Turkey was established, intellectuals and ideologists of 
Turkish modernism argued that the religious practices of Alevi commu-
nities were rooted in pre-Islamic Turkish traditions. Academics and politi-
cians used Alevism to demonstrate that Arabic Islam was alien to modern 
Turkish national and historical identity. Since the early Turkish Republic, 
the heterogenic cultural dimensions of Alevi communities in Turkey have 
been classified, with Turkish/Turkmen Alevism, Arabic Alevism and Kurdish 
Alevism established as the main classification categories. Accordingly, Alevis 
10 Sacred lineages are a common phenomenon among Muslim societies and Alevis. De-
scendants of the family of Muhammad are also called Sharif or Sayyid. Kurdish Alevis use 
the term Seyyid. Alevi families that claim descent from Muhammad are usually known as 
ocaks (meaning hearth in Turkish). For more information, see: Kazuo Morimoto, Sayyids 
and Sharifs in Muslim Societies: The Living Links to the Prophet (London: Routledge, 
2012). See also: Sarah Bowen Savant and Helena de Felipe, Genealogy and Knowledge in 
Muslim Societies: Understanding the Past (London: Edinburgh University Press, 2014). 
For sacred lineages in various Kurdish societies, see: Martin van Bruniessen, “Religion in 
Kurdistan,” Kurdish Times 4, no. 1–2 (1991).
11 The terms ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘heterodoxy’ are controversial, particularly when used in re-
lation to Alevism. They are often used to label politically unequal positions as more or 
less ‘correct’. For criticism of orientalist notions of ‘heterodoxy’, see: Mark Soileau, “Con-
forming Haji Bektash: A Saint and His Followers between Orthopraxy and Heteropraxy,” 
Die Welt des Islams 54, no. 3–4 (2014); Ayfer Karakaya-Stump, “The Vefā’iyye, the Bek-
tashiyye and Genealogies of ‘Heterodox’ Islam in Anatolia: Rethinking the Köprülü Par-
adigm,” Turcica, no. 44 (2012–2013); Markus Dressler, Writing Religion, 186–239; Janina 
Karolewski, “What is Heterodox About Alevism? The Development of Anti-Alevi Dis-
crimination and Resentment,” Die Welt des Islams, no. 48 (2008); Markus Dressler, “How 
to Conceptualize Inner-Islamic Plurality/Difference: ‘Heterodoxy’ and ‘Syncretism’ in the 
Writings of Mehmet F. Köprülü (1890–1966),” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 
37, no. 3 (2010).
12 Dressler, Writing Religion, 1–31. 
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in contemporary Turkey claim to have different ethnic orientations (Turkish/ 
Turkmen, Kurdish13 and Arabic). In addition, since Kurdish Alevis speak 
two main languages – Kurmanci and Kırmancki – they are usually defined as 
Kurds or Zazas. Kurmanci is well known as Kurdish and Kırmancki is mostly 
known as Zazaki in contemporary Turkey. The majority of Kurdish Alevis 
speak Kırmancki; the others speak both languages or only Kurmanci.14
Kurdish Alevis live in several eastern provinces of Turkey. Due to 
forced migration they also live in central and western parts of Anatolia. 
Moreover, economic reasons have resulted in continuous migrations to 
Western Turkey and Western Europe since the 1950s.15 Tunceli is located 
in the Eastern Anatolia region and is the only (Kurmanci-, Kırmancki- and 
Turkish-speaking) Alevi-majority province in Turkey, bordered by a tall 
mountain range and a huge dammed lake. It could be said that the moun-
tains and the lake create a psycho-geographical boundary for Kurdish 
Alevis. So much so that they define the territory as a sacred land. The 
Munzur Mountains run along its western and northern borders, while 
the Bingöl Mountains are to the east, and the Keban Dam is to the south. 
These geographic borders all separate Kurdish Alevis from the Sunni- 
Muslim-dominated world. In my previous works, I emphasized this region 
13 Some researchers distinguish Kurds and Zazas as separate national identities when consid-
ering language, namely Kurmanci (Kurdish) and Kırmancki (Zazaki). For detailed ethno-
graphic and historical information, see: Gezik and Gültekin, Kurdish Alevis, xx–xxiii.
14 The heated debate goes on between those who claim that Kurmanci and Kırmancki are 
different dialects of Kurdish, and those who believe them to be entirely different lan-
guages (Kurdish and Zazaki respectively). On one side of the debate there is the Kurdish 
nationalist position, which argues that Kırmancki is a dialect of Kurdish. On the other 
side, people who do not pursue a Kurdish nationalist agenda describe Kırmancki and its 
various dialects as Zazaki, and consider it to be a separate language to Kurmanci. Ac-
cordingly, Zazas (and the Alevis who speak Zazaki) are ethnically different from Kurds 
as well as Turks. For a brief overview of the respective debates, see: Michiel Leezenberg, 
“Kurdish Alevis and the Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s,” in Turkey’s Alevi 
Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview, ed. Paul J. White and Joost Jongerden (Leiden, Bos-
ton: Brill, 2003); Paul J. White, “The Debate on the Identity of the Alevi Kurds,” in Tur-
key’s Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview, ed. Paul J. White and Joost Jongerden 
(Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2003). Ultimately, all ethnic terms, such as Turk, Kurd, Zaza and 
Kırmanc, are directly related to religious identities in Tunceli and the surrounding regions. 
Being a Sunni or an Alevi determines ethnic definitions. For more information, see: Ahmet 
Kerim Gültekin, Tunceli’de Sünni Olmak: Ulusal ve Yerel Kimlik Öğelerinin Tunceli Pertek’te 
Etnolojik Tetkiki (Istanbul: Berfin Yayınları, 2010), 49–74; Erdal Gezik, Dinsel, Etnik ve Poli-
tik Sorunlar Bağlamında: Alevi Kürtler (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), 26–32.
15 Gezik and Gültekin, Kurdish Alevis, xix. See also: Keles, “The Politics of Religious and 
Ethnic Identity,” 189.
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as inner-Dersim to emphasise that this is the core of the cultural geogra-
phy of the Kurdish Alevi identity, constituting its historical and religious 
centre.16 It is still the central reference point for their cosmology and their 
ritual practices. Inner-Dersim’s other names are Jaru Diyar (the Sacred 
Land) or Herdu Dewres (the Land of Saints).17 These terms refer to a cul-
tural belonging to a specific region, which stems from ancestral ties and 
traditional religious knowledge. All sacred lineages of the Kurdish Alevis 
trace themselves back to this territory.
Map of Tunceli province, the only (Kurdish) Alevi-dominated province in Turkey. The distribution of 
local Sunni minority communities throughout the province is marked in black. Illustration by Ömer 
Akyüz.18
From the 16th to early 20th century, Dersim was the name of an Eastern 
Ottoman province. Until the Ottoman Empire was reorganised in the 19th 
century, the large Dersim province encompassed today’s Tunceli and some 
of the surrounding provinces. The residents of Dersim province, Kurdish 
16 Gültekin, Tunceli’de Sünni Olmak, 30.
17 While such terms as Kırmanciye Beleke (emphasising a multi-cultured social sphere), 
Hardu Dewres (the Land of Saints) and Jaru Diyar (Sacred Land) are used to identi-
fy the cultural geography of Dersim, Raa Haqi (the Path of God/Truth), Ewladê Haq 
(the Children of God/Truth), Ewladê Raye (the Children of the Path) are used for self- 
identification. There is obviously a strong symbolic tie between geography, sacredness 
and socio-cultural belonging.
18 For more about Sunni communities of Dersim, see: Gültekin, Tunceli’de Sünni Olmak.
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Alevi tribes, were famed for their warrior characteristics and religious 
heresy.19 Following the Ottoman-Safevid wars, the Çemizşgezek principality 
(the south-western district of Tunceli province today) was granted autono- 
my.20 This created relative autonomy for Kurdish Alevi tribes, who lived in 
the mountainous (inner-Dersim) areas. Within a few centuries, the tribes 
expanded their power and population (from the 16th century to the end of 
the 19th century) to other regions through their famous plunder economy. 
In contrast with their rising hegemony, Ottoman administrative reforms 
started restricting the tribes to inner-Dersim, and gradually cut their re-
lations with other tribes from the beginning of the 19th century.21 Due to 
the ongoing skirmishes between the state and tribes in the region, Dersim 
was defined by the Ottoman, and later the Turkish, bureaucracy as a place 
to discipline, conquer, colonise and forcibly Sunnify.22 This was a hundred-
year-long process, which culminated in the last rebellion in 1937 and the 
1938 massacre.23 Tunceli is the formal name of the province now, and was 
given by the Turkish government following the unsuccessful rebellion. 
19 Yalçın Çakmak, “II. Abdülhamid Döneminde Osmanlı Devleti’nin Kızılbaş/Alevî Siyase-
ti (1876–1909),” unpublished PhD Dissertation, Hacettepe University, 2018, 375–77. 
20 Gezik, Alevi Kürtler, 67.
21 Gezik, Alevi Kürtler, 63–73.
22 Hüseyin Aygün, Dersim 1938 ve Zorunlu İskân, (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2009). The 
Kurdish-Alevi-dominated population of Dersim was usually defined in Ottoman Turkish 
as ahali-i gayr-i mutîa (‘disobedient people’) and the people who lived near the Kurdish 
Alevi tribes were labelled ahali-i mutîa (‘obedient people’), namely Turkish- or Kurman-
ci-speaking Sunnis. For reports on Dersim written by civil and military officials, see also: 
Faik Bulut, Dersim Raporları (Istanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayın, 2013). 
23 The 1938 massacre was the main breaking point for the traditional socio-religious insti-
tutions of Dersim Alevism, and a foretaste of forced integration policies in the modern 
era. It has decisive consequences for the evaluation of today’s ethnic identity politics and 
religious aspects of Kurdish Alevism. See: Özlem Göner, “Histories of 1938 in Turkey 
Memory, Consciousness, and Identity of Outsiderness,” International Review of Qualita-
tive Research 9, no. 2 (2016); Hayal Hanoğlu, “Formation of Genocide Consciousness in 
Dersim Society,” unpublished MA Thesis, University of London, 2015; Yıldız Yıldırım, 
“Cultural Memory in Post 1937–1938 Dersim Laments: Reflections On Trauma and Vi-
olence,” unpublished MA Thesis, Istanbul Technical University, 2013; Özlem Göner, “A 
Social History of Power and Struggle in Turkey: State, Memory, Movements, and Identity 
of Outsiderness in Dersim,” unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 
2012; Hans-Lukas Kieser, “Dersim Massacre, 1937–1938,” Violence de masse et Résistance 
– Réseau de recherché, 27 July, 2011, https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-mas-
sacre-resistance/fr; Martin van Bruniessen, “The Suppression of the Dersim Rebellion 
in Turkey (1937–38),” in Genocide in Kurdistan? The Suppression of the Dersim Rebellion 
in Turkey (1937–38) and the Chemical War Against the Iraqi Kurds (1988), ed. George J. 
Andreopoulos (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994).
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It means bronze hand and symbolises the ultimate victory of the republic 
over the tribes. The subject of identity in the region came to the forefront 
again in the 1990s with the Kurdish Alevi uprisings and military campaigns. 
It can be said that Dersim – both sociologically and spatially – characterises 
the Kurdish Alevis of Tunceli and a vast area inhabited by Kurmanci- and 
Kırmancki-speaking Alevis. 24
A Brief Summary of a Socio-Religious Organisation: Raa Haqi
Raa Haqi25 (in Kırmancki, the Path of Truth) is the traditional name for the 
belief system of Kurdish Alevis. It is mostly called Kurdish Alevism today, a 
relatively new term that puts the focus on the ethno-religious identity.26 The 
coherence of beliefs of nature and hereditary kinship relations are the unique 
features of Raa Haqi. In this system, the central role is held by sacred lin-
eages. The obligatory religious relations between the sacred lineages, who 
are themselves organised as tribes, and follower (talip) tribes, structure the 
social, political, economic and religious spheres of Kurdish Alevism. The 
second major axis defining the peculiarity of Raa Haqi is the beliefs and 
practices shaped around sacred places, namely jiare (in Kırmancki). Similar-
ly, the rituals of Kurdish-Alevi beliefs also have two main dimensions. One 
is related to sacred lineages and talips. Here, cem ceremonies27 and visiting 
24 It is worth noting that, until 1915, Dersim was home to a large number of Armenians. As 
a result of the Armenian Genocide, the population in the region decreased dramatically. 
See: Raymond Kevorkian, The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History (London, New 
York: I.B.Tauris, 2011). See also: Dressler, Writing Religion, 106–12.
25 See: Dilşa Deniz, “Kurdish Alevi Belief System, ReyaHeqi/Raa Haqi: Structure, Net-
working, Ritual and Function,” in Kurdish Alevis and the Case of Dersim: Historical and 
Contemporary Insights, ed. Erdal Gezik and Ahmet Kerim Gültekin (Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 2019); Erdal Gezik and Hüseyin Çakmak, Raa Haqi – Riya Haqi/Dersim Aleviliği 
İnanç Terimleri Sözlüğü (Ankara: Kalan Yayınları, 2010); Erdal Gezik, “Rayberler, Pirler 
ve Mürşidler,” in Alevi Ocakları ve Örgütlenmeleri, ed. Erdal Gezik and Mesut Özcan 
(Ankara: Kalan Yayınları, 2013); Hüseyin Çakmak, Dersim Aleviliği: Raa Haqi (Ankara: 
Kalan Yayınları, 2013).
26 For a brief insight into such new terms that aim to explain the uniqueness of the eth-
nic identity as well as the belief system of Kurdish Alevis, see: İmran Gürtaş, “Dersim 
Alevilerinde Kimlik İnşası ve Travma,” in Kızılbaşlık, Alevilik, Bektaşilik Tarih-Kimlik-İn-
anç-Ritüel, ed. Yalçın Çakmak and İmran Gürtaş (Ankara: İletişim Yayınları, 2015), 
309–27. 
27 Cem ceremonies are the fundamental social and religious practices of Kurdish Alevi com-
munities, which follow a particular procedure, though there may be some differences 
13
the ocaks of sacred lineages are the main characteristics of the socio-religious 
aspect. The second is worshipping nature-based sacred places such as trees, 
mountains, rocks, caves, rivers, lakes, fountains, the sun and the moon. Each 
jiare is connected with a particular semi-deific being. They may be either 
male or female and may have a kind or malicious character. Some of them 
are related to sacred lineages.
Tribal structures and religious positions among Kurdish Alevi tribes. 
The socio-religious formation of Kurdish Alevism can be likened to a 
caste system. Starting at the bottom and working upwards, first, there are 
talips. They are the followers of sacred lineages. Talips mostly speak Kır-
mancki, but there are also Kurmanci- and Turkish-speaking talips and 
ocaks in Dersim.28 To better understand current religion-making process, 
between the cem ceremonies of different Alevi communities. They are performed accord-
ing to a religious calendar or on special occasions. All men, women, elders and children can 
participate in the ceremony, and it must be conducted under the strict religious and social 
authority of the pir (this title may also be called baba, dede or seyit). During these gather-
ings, ritual practices are performed, and socio-political matters are discussed to make com-
munal decisions. There may be punishment, yet violence (in the sense of killing) is strictly 
forbidden. The utmost punishment is ex-communication. See: Çakmak, Dersim Aleviliği, 
66–113; Deniz, “Kurdish Alevi Belief System,” 45–75.
28 Ocaks are usually associated with missionary saints, such as Hacı Bektaş-i Veli, from the 
9th to 13th century. According to this point of view, some pioneer Alevi creeds and their 
founders were turned into veli (saint) beliefs as well as socio-religious organisations in 
time. This process is reflective of demographic, economic and political factors which 
continue to affect the formation of the socio-religious sphere of Alevism. For more in-
formation on processes of Islamisation of non-Turkish speaking communities such as 
Kurds, Armenians, Anatolian Greeks etc., see: Ahmet Karamustafa, “Anadolu’nun İs-
lamlaşması Bağlamında Aleviliğin Oluşumu,” in Kızılbaşlık Alevilik Bektaşilik – Tarih 
Kimlik İnanç Ritüel, ed. Yalçın Çakmak and İmran Gürtaş (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 















































it is crucial to understand the social roles and the flexible characteristics 
of relations between talips and pirs. Talips represent the majority of the 
community. They live in tribal organisations and have sacred bonds to 
ocaks, which they gain through birth (and which are unalterable). Deniz29 
defines this relational system through the notion of receiving as well as 
providing a religious service.30 She emphasises that while talips receive the 
religious service, raybers, pirs and mürşids both receive (among them-
selves) and provide. Pir-talip relations could create a non-spatial element, 
which can be re-produced anywhere and at any time. In fact, they have 
already been re-produced in the metropoles of Turkey and in Europe in 
recent decades.31 Second, there are raybers, who can be considered as local, 
practical guides as well as consultants on religious issues. If the symbolism 
of Raa Haqi is considered a path to follow, guides are needed. A rayber’s 
duty is to arrange meetings of pirs and talips. He collates crucial socio- 
political issues to be discussed during the cem ceremonies. He teaches reli-
gious ethics, informs about social rules and also holds a religious authority 
as a consultant for socio-religious matters. Third, there are pirs (who need 
to be seyits). Pirs are the spiritual guides of their followers, as well as the em-
bodiment of the sacred lineage. They are believed to perform miracles (ker-
amet) and to possess magical, mystic healing powers, as did their mytho-
logical forefathers. Some ocaks are especially well-known for their pirs, who 
fall into a trance during cem ceremonies. They are also the keepers of certain 
holy objects32 that mostly belong to the mythological ancestors of sacred 
Tasavvufunun Kökenleri Sorunu,” in Osmanlı Toplumunda Tasavvuf ve Sufiler, ed. Ahmet 
Yaşar Ocak (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2005). We must question how some 
Kurdish tribes converted to Alevism, while others followed Sunni sects, with both groups 
viewing their socio-religious organisations as being shaped by the sacred lineages, who 
claim to have blood ties with the prophet’s household. It should also be noted that this 
claim is the main bond between Islamic cosmology and Kurdish Alevism. 
29 Deniz, “Kurdish Alevi Belief System,” 55.
30 The service, traditionally, was carried out annually by pirs, who travelled (on foot) from 
village to village to visit their talip communities in different regions. At every stop, a cem 
ceremony was held under the pir’s leadership. These meetings are still essential for prac-
tising the religion, as well as maintaining social relations between talips and pirs. 
31 See: Annika Törne, “Dedes in Dersim: Narratives of Violence and Persecution,” Iran and 
the Caucasus 16, no. 1 (2012); Annika Törne, “On the Grounds Where They Will Walk 
in a Hundred Years of Time: Struggling with the Heritage of the Past in post-Genocidal 
Tunceli,” European Journal of Turkish Studies, no. 20 (2015); Tina Hamrin-Dahl, “The 
Alevi and Questions of Identity, Including Violence and Insider/Outsider Perspectives,” 
Scripta Instituti Donneriani Aboensis no. 19 (2006).
32 There are different kinds of sacred objects in Dersim. They could be a cup, a glove or a 
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lineages. They visit their followers annually and these journeys are sacred, 
too. It is a true reflection of following the path for both pirs and talips. Pirs 
have the right to collect çıralık33 on these journeys. There is also a constant 
population increase of sacred lineages and talip tribes, which is a direct 
result of the growing population, as well as migration to different regions 
and re-establishing the same socio-religious organisation. Finally, there are 
mürşids (or the pirê piran, pir of the pirs), who hold a superior position with 
judicial authority among the ocaks. Ocaks also have similar obligatory rela-
tions between one another, as is the case between talips and pirs.34 The four 
positions (talips, raybers, pirs and mürşids) symbolise four doors and forty 
levels35, which should ideally be passed during a lifetime. This path can only 
be followed with the help of a member (pir) of a sacred lineage for talips and 
pirs, too. Therefore, practically every member of this system is a talip, and 
should have a rayber-pir-mürşid network to follow the path. This is where 
the ikrar (sacred loyalty or sacred contract)36 comes in. It creates crucial reli-
gious and social bonds between individuals and ocaks as well as tribes. Some 
piece of parchment. Some famous ones are called tarix. These are thin wooden sticks, 
each one featuring a unique anthropomorphic character and each having a special name. 
They are capable of special miracles and can transform into a snake (or dragon) during 
cem ceremonies. They are also called jiare, the name that is also given to sacred places. 
Accordingly, not only are they highly valuable, but also dangerous, mystic objects that 
have to be kept by raybers or pirs and mürşids. They are used to heal, and are commonly 
employed to treat people who are paralysed or suffering from psychological problems. 
For more information, see: Gezik and Çakmak, Raa Haqi – Riya Haqi, 193.
33 A material or financial contribution to the pir, given by his talips. Sometimes talips pay 
this contribution by undertaking work for pirs.
34 See: Gezik and Gültekin, Kurdish Alevis, xv–xxvii; Gezik, “Rayberler, Pirler ve Mürşidler,” 11–78.
35 Dört Kapı Kırk Makam (Four Doors and Forty Levels) is a metaphor for the spiritual 
path. It refers to the four specific stages (şeriat, tarikat, marifet, hakikat) of the divine 
path, and ten separate sub-stages for each one which must be passed under guidance of a 
pir. Şeriat defines ten strict rules, defining orthopraxy to the believers. Tarikat defines a 
sacred brotherhood, which means being a member of a creed. Marifet refers to mystical 
knowledge about God/Truth, and finally Hakikat refers to being one with the ultimate 
Truth. The aim of an Alevi individual is to follow the path, and try to reach the final 
point, insan-ı kâmil (a person who is united with the ultimate truth). However, in the case 
of Kurdish Alevism, all individuals pass the first, second and third Kapıs by right of birth. 
Afterwards, by entering the ikrar-based sacred relationship musahiplik (see footnote 38), 
they automatically reach the fourth stage. For more information, see: Gezik, Alevi Kür-
tler, 38–41. See also: Gezik, “Rayberler, Pirler ve Mürşidler,” 19.
36 For a more extensive explanation of the term ikrar, see: Deniz, “Kurdish Alevi Belief 
System,” 45–75.
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religious institutions, such as kirvelik37 and musahiplik38, which show the 
social and religious aspects of ikrar.
To summarise, Raa Haqi depends on a religious and socio-politically 
enclosed tribal organisation, which emerges through real and fictional kin-
ships in relation to a tribe and an ocak (sacred lineage). The belief system 
also has strong symbolic and functional institutions, such as kirvelik and 
musahiplik. Interestingly, the social relations between talips and pirs seem 
flexible. Taking socio-religious relations as a whole, the Raa Haqi belief 
system can be examined within two main dimensions in the sense of prac-
tising religion: ikrar-based obligatory religious relations, and the worship 
of sacred places. Ikrar-based obligatory religious relations establish social 
relations between pirs and talips, as well as some obligatory relations be-
tween ocaks. The worship of sacred places could be said to provide more 
space for individual piety given the fact that worshipping nature-based 
sacred objects does not require any religious guidance or authority.
In the 20th century, Kurdish Alevis faced two major incidents that had 
a catastrophic impact on their social organisation. The first was the 1938 
massacre. Almost all sacred lineages were severely affected: most were 
killed and the survivors were exiled. This was the main breaking point for 
the traditional socio-religious institutions of Dersim Alevism. Until the 
1990s, Kurdish Alevis were able to re-organise the religious order, even 
though it was not quite the same as before 1938. Despite criticism from 
37 Kirvelik is a crucial fictional kinship among Kurdish Alevis and also a common tradition 
within other Kurdish-speaking religious communities. It may be considered as a god- 
father relationship between two families. It is also a vital institution for social solidarity 
in the region. It is based on male circumcision. See: Gültekin, Tunceli’de Sünni Olmak, 
173–95. Kirvelik is also a way of establishing social, economic and even political alliances 
among different religious (Sunnis, Alevis, Christians, etc.) communities throughout the 
Middle East, especially Kurmanci- and Kırmancki-speaking Kurdish communities. See: 
Martin Strohmeier and Lale Yalçın-Heckmann, Kürtler: Tarih, Siyaset, Kültür (Istanbul: 
Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2013); Ayşe Kudat, Kirvelik: Sanal Akrabalığın Dünü Bugünü 
(Ankara: Ütopya Yayınevi, 2004).
38 In Raa Haqi, the institution of musahiplik has a central importance. It is a fictional kin-
ship, similar to kirvelik, and the most important way of establishing ikrar. One can only 
be musahip to another Kurdish Alevi individual. Choosing a musahip from outside of 
the community is forbidden. It is an obligatory ritual brotherhood for all Kurdish Alevis. 
Every talip or rayber, pir, mürşid must has a musahip to be able to follow the divine path. 
It is created through a ritual brotherhood of two young male members of the community. 
Its actual purpose is to strengthen solidarity through strict social, religious and economic 
obligations. See: Deniz, “Kurdish Alevi Belief System,” 45–75; Gezik and Çakmak, Raa 
Haqi – Riya Haqi, 123–28. 
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the new generations who were greatly involved in armed socialist struggles 
during the 1970s, pirs and talips (who survived the 1938 massacre) were 
still in contact. In 1994, after clashes between armed guerrilla groups and 
the Turkish state intensified, almost the entire area occupied by Kurdish 
Alevis was forcibly evacuated. This was the second incident and seems 
to have had a detrimental impact on traditional pir and talip relations.39 
Nonetheless, sacred places remained unchanged. Shortly after the turn 
of the century, they became instruments for reinventing Dersim cultural 
identity. This time, talips – who have always practised rituals at sacred plac-
es – have taken on a major role in recreating the socio-religious sphere, and 
managing the politics of cultural identity.
Creating New Ways of Maintaining Religion
Many Kurdish Alevis are still heavily involved in multi-sided political 
movements, which are mostly related to socialist views and Kurdish nation- 
alism. In recent decades, some Kurdish Alevi intellectuals have taken a 
different approach, which could be termed Dersim ethnicism. They argue 
that Dersim Alevism or Raa Haqi seems to be a unique cultural system with 
unique religious, linguistic, historical, sociological and anthropological 
elements. They point to rare rituals, cosmological discourses, mythical 
narratives and the unwritten historical past of Kurdish Alevi tribes.40 This 
new ethno-cultural discourse has been welcomed primarily by younger 
generations and popularised through popular cultural materials such as 
ethnic Dersim music rather than through political arguments.41
39 Forced evacuations and environmental destruction have played a specific role in the his-
torical development of Kurdish Alevi communities. See: Martin van Bruniessen, Forced 
Evacuations and Destruction of Villages in Dersim (Tunceli) and Western Bingöl, Turkish 
Kurdistan September-November 1994 (Utrecht: Utrecht University Repository, 1995); 
Joost Jongerden, “Resettlement and Reconstruction of Identity: The Case of the Kurds in 
Turkey,” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 1, no. 1 (2001); Jacob van Etten et al., “Envi-
ronmental Destruction as a Counterinsurgency Strategy in the Kurdistan Region of Tur-
key,” Geoforum 39, no. 5 (2008); Joost Jongerden, “Village Evacuation and Reconstruction 
in Kurdistan (1993–2002),” Études Rurales 2, no. 186 (2010).
40 See: Gürtaş, “Dersim Alevilerinde Kimlik İnşası ve Travma,” 309–27.
41 On the role of music and media as identifiers of Dersim ethnic identity during the Alevi 
Renaissance/Awakening, see: Leyla Neyzi, “Zazaname: Alevi Renaissance, Media and 
Music in the Nineties,” in Turkey’s Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview, ed. Paul 
J. White and Joost Jongerden (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2003). Erdemir points out several 
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After the millennium, sacred places also gained very wide popularity 
in line with the rise of Dersim ethnicism42 among Kurdish Alevis. They 
became powerful indicators of cultural identity and symbols of Kurdish 
Alevism. The practices surrounding sacred places also have strong political 
implications. For example, the most influential argument against planned 
dam projects on the rivers of Dersim in the mid-2000s43 drew on the idea 
of defending sacred lands. With rural life in Dersim already destroyed, 
Kurdish Alevis regarded the dam projects as another threat to the survival 
of sacred land. Tunceli therefore became the only city where almost every 
inhabitant marched to protest against the dam in 2014 – the largest march 
seen in Turkey to this day in defence of the environment.
The aspect of social transformation in Kurdish Alevism that has attracted 
the most attention is the increasing social and political role of lay individuals 
(talips) compared to the members of sacred lineages. Talip activities seem 
to be reshaping some conventional cultural institutions and obligatory reli-
gious relations, such as being member of the boards of the Alevi associations, 
which are also acting in the name of Alevism as a religion. This reveals that, 
under certain conditions, individual social agency may have contributed to a 
new type of religion-making process. It should be acknowledged that mem-
bers of sacred lineages are also trying to use political activities to take ad-
vantage of their socio-political status for the purpose of re-establishing their 
religious prestige. For this to be achieved, pirs are instrumentalising sacred 
places via the cemevis that have been built in the region in recent years.
Cemevis gained importance among political Alevi movements after they 
migrated to the metropoles of Turkey and Europe.44 Cemevi is the name for 
historical and social events to analyse increasing attention on Alevism among politicians 
and intellectuals, which took place in the 1990s. The Alevi Awakening has also been 
described as a process of discovery, enlightenment, innovation, coming out, revival, re-
making, re-politicisation and the explosion of Alevism. See: Aykan Erdemir, “Tradition 
and Modernity: Turkey’s Ambiguous Terms and Turkey’s Ambivalent Subjects,” Middle 
Eastern Studies 41, no. 6 (2005); see also: Mehmet Ertan, Aleviliğin Politikleşme Süreci – 
Kimlik Siyasetinin Sınırlılıkları ve İmkânları (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2017).
42 Some researchers refer to this as ‘Dersim revival’; see: Besim Can Zırh, “1980’ler Alevilik, 
2000’ler Dersim: Uyanışı Anlamak,” Alevilerin Sesi 161 (2012), with reference to Alevi 
Awakening.
43 See: Celal Cahit Agar and Steffen Böhm, “Towards a Pluralist Labor Geography: Con-
strained Grassroots Agency and the Socio-Spatial Fix in Dȇrsim, Turkey,” Environment 
and Planning 50, no. 6 (2018).
44 At the turn of the century, cemevis became the main argument used by Alevi organisa-
tions to claim equal constitutional rights and official recognition from Turkey and the 
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the associations and buildings that have been established by almost all Alevi 
communities since the 1990s to bring the community together to practise the 
most important Alevi ritual: cem ceremonies. They are also used for social 
events, such as funerals and weddings. However, their political symbolism 
implies much more than the provision of social services. Re-forming Alev-
ism as a modern religion with a view to gaining official recognition requires 
certain systematic rituals to be established, spatially redesigned sacred places 
and rewritten theology and history, too. Various definitions of Alevism in 
annual EU Commission reports on Turkey have played an important role for 
Alevi associations – both in Turkey and the EU – and impacted their politi-
cal and religious discourses.45 The question of Cemevi has taken the central 
position within these heated debates, explicating political stances and thus 
revealing different faces of multi-Alevism.
Talips’ socio-religious interpretations are creating a new socio-religious 
sphere. Talips are also using sacred places as signifiers of cultural identity. 
Moreover, cemevis – whether as legal (EU) or de-facto (Turkey) institution-
al spaces of Aleviness in the 21st century – at sacred places create historical 
and social continuity and give talips the chance to be a religious, political 
authority which they had never been. In the following, I would like to shed 
light on how sacred places became a determining factor for increasing the 
societal, political and religious roles of talips.
EU. Cemevis were presented by Alevis as undeniable proof of the religious uniqueness 
of Alevism. This policy quickly yielded results in the 2000s in some European countries 
(first in Germany) but not in Turkey. For the first time, Alevism was officially recognised 
as an independent religious community. Despite Turkey’s negative attitude towards Alev-
ism, the official status of Alevism in Europe had a large-scale sociological and politi-
cal impact among all Alevi communities. Looking into Cemevis may provide potential 
perspectives on religion-making processes in secularist contexts in the EU. For further 
information on these processes and debates, see: Murat Es, “Alevist Politics of Place and 
the Construction of Cemevis in Turkey,” unpublished MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 
2006; Elise Massicard, “Alevi Communities in Western Europe: Identity and Religious 
Strategies,” in Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, ed. Jorgen S. Nielsen et al. (Leiden: Brill, 
2010); Martin Sökefeld, “Alevis in Germany and The Politics of Recognition,” New Per-
spectives on Turkey, no. 28–29 (2003); Derya Özkul, “The Making of a Transnational 
Religion: Alevi Movement in Germany and the World Alevi Union,” British Journal of 
Middle Eastern Studies 46, no. 2 (2019); Ali Çarkoğlu and Nazlı Çağın Bilgili, “A Precar-
ious Relationship: The Alevi Minority, the Turkish State and the EU,” South European 
Society and Politics 16, no. 2 (2011); Besim Can Zırh, “Euro-Alevis: From Gasterbeiter to 
Transnational Community,” in The Making of World Society: Perspectives from Transna-
tional Research, ed. Remus Gabriel Anghel, Eva Gerharz, Gilberto Rescher, and Monika 
Salzbrunn (Bielefeld: transcript, 2008).
45 See: Besim Can Zırh, “Euro-Alevis,” 103–30.
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Firstly, as a consequence of forced modernisation as well as political 
conflicts in the 20th century, the socio-religious relations between talips and 
pirs fell apart. Sacred places, however, remained. They had always played 
a crucial role in providing a space for everyday religious practices. Kurdish 
Alevis go to sacred places frequently as individuals or with household 
groups. These practices play a significant role in everyday religious life in 
Dersim. All religious needs are supplied through such nature-based worship. 
While the socio-religious organisations, which depend on the caste system 
of talips and pirs, cover the collective ritual sphere, the sacred-place practices 
give more independence to individuals, creating a shared sense of practising 
religion without religious authorities. There was therefore no essential need 
for cultural institutional relations between pirs and talips to practise rituals at 
sacred places. For 21st-century talips seeking to strengthen their social posi-
tion, sacred-place practices thus opened up the possibility of independence 
from religious authority. In addition to this, sacred places gained decisive 
importance for the enculturation of new generations. While rituals were 
being practised at sacred places, constituent elements of cultural identity 
were reshaped in line with the talips’ perspective. Their everyday social cul-
tures, political attitudes and religious tendencies started to fill the gaps that 
had opened during the absence of the representatives of the sacred lineages.
The lack of traditional religious knowledge among the new generations 
of Kurdish Alevis as well as the political activities of some pirs affected this 
process. Increasingly, talips started to demand well-organised, systematic, 
functional cultural knowledge of Alevi identity in terms of history, theol-
ogy, linguistics and even sociology. In addition, heated debates and politi-
cal tensions surrounding Alevism and the Kurdish issue in Turkey resulted 
in a need to re-organise cultural heritage, re-positioning it in accordance 
with contemporary transnational circumstances. This socio-political con-
text put substantial pressure on the pirs. In order to maintain their reli-
gious prestige, they had to adjust to the political positions of their talips’ 
organisations or at least felt obliged to follow the political tendencies of 
their talips. In addition to widely heterogeneous, complex social tribal as 
well as individual networks among ocaks and their talips, multiple views 
regarding Alevi politics developed. These diverse religio-political trends 
are evident in the activities of associations, political parties, journals, etc. 
Pirs thus face many challenges that they have to overcome if they want to 
obtain a political voice. 
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In the new context of post-1990 transnational Kurdish Alevism, pirs 
were no longer the only representatives of the socio-religious cultural 
sphere. New actors had emerged as a consequence of the politicisation 
of Alevism in the 1990s. These were talips, who had become involved in 
re-inventing Kurdish Alevi identity. In addition, leading Alevi associations 
engaged in negotiations with Turkish and European state authorities on 
behalf of the Alevis. Thus, the religious part of Alevism (for example, the pir 
and his duties), in the sense of acting and leading rituals, became more and 
more separated from social and political aspects. This could be interpreted 
as a kind of mutually beneficial agreement between talips and pirs. 
 Alevi associations’ numbers have increased as a result of politicisation. 
At the same time, the pirs’ social and religious role has been reformulated 
with their authority restricted to religion. Some pirs have chosen to focus 
on religious service only, and started to build their own cemevis at particu-
lar sacred places or in their villages.
Secondly, following the main break-down of socio-religious relations 
between talips and pirs, sacred places remain as places where one can prac-
tically experience Kurdish Alevi cultural identity. Given that sacred places 
always played a key role in everyday life, the pirs’ service was not necessari-
ly required, except for cem ceremonies. Consequently, even Kurdish Alevis 
living in places like Western Europe did not find it difficult to continue 
their daily religious practices. Today, many Kurdish Alevis in Europe use 
churches or even their own homes to light candles if they have no opportu-
nity to go to a cemevi. Besides, being a member of a cemevi community can 
depend more on political than on religious positions.
Thirdly, there has always been a hidden tension between the sacred 
place beliefs of talips and the religious authority of sacred lineages.46 This 
tension could be interpreted as a way in which the talips justify their 
occasional resistance to their pirs’ decisions. There is therefore compe-
tition between pirs and talips over religious prestige and authority. In 
some cases, talips have rejected pirs’ decisions, while legitimising their 
own practices based on their own mystic interpretations of sacred places. 
Today, ocak members are beginning to use popular sacred places in order 
to re-establish their religious authority vis-à-vis their talips.
46 For some ethnographical data regarding the issue, see: Ahmet Kerim Gültekin, “Bir Der-
leme ve Bazı Notlar: Ahmet Dede ile Görüşme,” Munzur – Dersim Etnografya Dergisi, no. 
19 (2004).
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Pirs are also trying to provide religious services not just to their own 
talips, who have to follow their ocak according to the cultural ideal, but 
also to other talips. There is thus a transformation of obligatory hereditary 
tribal religious relations with institutions being re-interpreted in line with 
new organisational standards as well as changing socio-spatial contexts. 
In other words, the religious institutions which used to depend on heredi-
tary talip-rehber-pir-mürşid relations, are being abandoned and replaced by 
voluntary membership in an Alevi association. Today, many Kurdish Alevi 
talips can choose to be a member of any of the Alevi associations, or ce-
mevi, and participate in activities regardless of who their inherited ocak is. 
The information above is commonly outlined by academics writing 
about societal change in Alevism. Below, I will briefly evaluate some pre-
liminary outcomes of my project.
Fourth, talips’ new secular, political and social spheres, which have espe-
cially developed in Western European countries, have started to reshape sa-
cred places spatially as well as socio-religiously. Pirs had to follow talips with-
in this new religious-spatial context. As an example, owing to the Turkish 
authorities’ continued discrimination against Alevis, the only way of gaining 
planning permission to construct cemevis near to sacred places in Dersim is 
to establish them as legal associations. The boards of management of these 
associations are comprised of both talips and pirs, something that would 
have been unthinkable in the hierarchical order of traditional Alevism. At 
the same time, the growing prestige of sacred places and increasing numbers 
of cemevis has led to competition between different pirs, who seek to attract 
followers’ attention in order to strengthen their religious authority.
The talips’ relatively autonomous religious sphere has gained new fea-
tures in Western Europe. Following their successful efforts to gain formal 
recognition in Europe (in contrast to their counterparts in Turkey), Alevi 
associations were eager to take advantage of opportunities that opened 
up to them. This quickly resulted in a situation that might be described as 
multi-Alevism. Each association, as a religious-political agent, started to 
create its own Alevi discourse, in terms of history and even theology. The 
social-political heterogeneity of Alevi communities – with local differences 
such as customs, languages etc. – undoubtedly fed the competition be-
tween them.
Fifth, the socio-cultural backgrounds of talips have changed almost 
completely. This is closely related to the new generations who were born 
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in Western Europe and educated about religion following Western secu-
lar notions. Knowledge concerning the distinction between religious and 
non-religious spheres has strongly influenced all ritual-related aspects. For 
example, the construction of cemevis near sacred places is intentionally re-
lated to re-shaping these sacred places. According to the new way of think-
ing, if Alevism (Raa Haqi) is a religion, it should have buildings of worship 
that can reflect the sacredness of the Alevi cosmology. If not, sacred places 
should be spatially well-organised and should have a proper religious ap-
pearance.
The tensions between Alevis and other Islamic communities in Europe 
and in Turkey also need to be considered as factors in the transformation 
of Alevism. Most Alevis want well-organised sacred places to represent 
their religion to others. It is important to remember that the spatial plan-
ning of sacred places began long before the establishment of cemevis. It was 
with the increasing effects of modern religious contexts on Alevism that 
new constructions – such as cemevis – began to appear on sacred places. 
This was mostly a societal and political necessity resulting from a new un-
derstanding of Alevism.
Conclusion
The significance of the role played by sacred places in contemporary 
Kurdish Alevism comes to the fore when talips obtain a position where 
they can be considered as the carriers of the religion. As a result of conven-
tional caste relations falling apart during the 20th century, the members of 
sacred lineages started following their talips all around the world and began 
to adhere to their talips’ new social, political and religious tendencies. The 
secularisation process can be understood as a re-conceptualisation of the 
Kurdish Alevis’ cultural identity. Within this transformation process, the 
re-organisation of sacred places plays a crucial role.
Kurdish Alevi sacred place practices have never required a religious 
guide. They depend on personal or communal practices without any writ-
ten rules or systematic instructions. In view of the disintegration of con-
ventional caste relations, sacred places have served more and more as per-
sonal religious spaces. With the politicisation of Kurdish Alevi communities 
in Turkey and Western Europe, these spaces have become increasingly 
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suited to new actors, namely talips. Different Alevi associations have used 
the spaces as symbols of Kurdish Alevi cultural identity.
Talip-dominated Kurdish Alevi socio-political practices and dis-
courses about sacred places appear to be a relatively recent phenomenon. 
An example of religion making from below,47 this transformation appears 
to serve to secure cultural continuity and create a strong socio-politi-
cal position for the subordinated Kurdish Alevi identity. By instrumen- 
talising sacred places, talips seem to be able to influence pirs and use 
cemevis to practise religion in a new way. Thus, while it should be 
acknowledged that pirs are also trying to gain political capital from the 
described transformation, one of the most important outcomes of this 
era is talips’ increasing domination of Kurdish Alevism. The transfor-
mation of Kurdish Alevism can be understood as a reconceptualisation 
of cultural identity linked to sacred places, which reflects a new socio- 
religious order between pirs and talips.
47 Dreßler, “Modes of Religionization,” 12.
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